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PROPERTY, UNBUNDLED WATER 
ENTITLEMENTS, AND  
ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES:  
A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM AUSTRALIA 
Paul Babie,* Paul Leadbeter,† and Kyriaco Nikias+ 
ABSTRACT 
 As water becomes an increasingly scarce resource, a lack of clarity in relation to its 
use can produce both conflict among and inefficient use by users. In order to encourage 
markets in water and to ensure the viability and functionality of those markets, 
governments in many jurisdictions have moved away from commons property as a means 
of water allocation, and towards systems of private property in water. In doing so, one 
policy and legal option is “unbundling”, which seeks carefully to define both the entitlement 
to water and its separation into constituent parts. Advocates claim that unbundling makes 
water rights easier to value, monitor, and trade. But is unbundling the most efficient 
means of allocating water use rights? Or might such fragmentation produce what has come 
to be called an “anticommons tragedy”? To answer these questions, this article contains 
four parts. The Introduction provides the legal background to the modern means of 
allocating the use of water amongst competing, or rivalrous, users. Part I considers the 
theoretical nature of property, and the way in which such theory might be extended to 
water allocation through unbundling. Part II presents unbundling as it has been 
implemented in the Australian state of South Australia. This allows us to assess the extent 
to which the stated policy rationale for unbundling—certainty and transferability of 
entitlements—has been achieved and the extent to which this is a desirable outcome. Our 
analysis can be applied to any jurisdiction, most notably the arid and semi-arid 
southwestern United States, considering unbundling as a legal and policy option for the 
allocation of water use. The Conclusion reflects upon the potential for unbundling water 
entitlements in arid or semi-arid environments. The South Australian experience reveals 
a reluctance to embrace unbundling, both on the part of the state in terms of implementing, 
and on the part of market actors holding existing proprietary interests in water. This 
reluctance ought to be viewed by other jurisdictions as a warning about the effectiveness 
and efficiency of unbundling. We show that unbundling efforts may not only fail to 
provide efficiency gains, but also, and much more worryingly, may in fact drive 
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anticommons tragedies that entirely inhibit any beneficial use. We propose that our 
anecdotal and theoretical analysis of South Australia requires empirical research both in 
Australia and in other jurisdictions climatologically, hydrologically, and in underlying 
legal framework, similar to Australia. Such empirical research will test our conclusions in 
relation to South Australia, both in respect to the operation of the water market and as to 
the behavior of market actors. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
WATER LAW IN ARID AND SEMI-ARID ENVIRONMENTS 
The allocation of proprietary interests in scarce, fugacious natural resources 
bedevils most of the legal systems the world has known. In relation to petroleum 
resources, for instance, John Bishop Ballem, the leading Canadian authority on the 
subject, tells us that 
[t]he petroleum and natural gas lease is a curious document. It has to be. 
Any legal instrument that purports to define property rights over miner-
als inconsiderate enough to move from one place to another, and under-
ground at that, cannot be expected to follow the conventional form.1 
Water behaves in a very similar way to petroleum resources, both on and below the 
surface of land.2 As such, it exhibits the same difficulties of characterizing and de-
fining proprietary interests. Kevin Gray writes “in English law water is incapable 
 
 1. John Bishop Ballem, The Perilous Life of an Oil and Gas Lease, 44 CAN. BAR REV. 523, 523 
(1966); see also JOHN BISHOP BALLEM, THE OIL AND GAS LEASE IN CANADA 3 (4th ed. 2008). 
 2. See KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 25 (2nd ed. 1993). 
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of being owned.”3 For that reason, “[a]lthough . . . [it] can contemplate with equa-
nimity the conveyance of an estate in thin air, it has substantially more difficulty in 
relation to a conveyance of water.”4 Joshua Getzler expands: 
Flowing water cannot be possessed in a tangible fashion like land, only 
quasi-possessed or appropriated by user. The common-law theory of title 
based on a hierarchy of seisin or possession required some apparent us-
er—a matter of evidence—in order to establish an actionable right. The 
requirement of established use to ground seisin was emphasized by the 
rise to dominance of the trespass on the case form of action, which charac-
teristically focused on indirect or non-invasive damage. Hence water 
rights defended by action on the case came to appear as possessory inter-
ests based upon current usage, rather than titles or claims to a resource 
regardless of levels of use; and the legal system found it particularly diffi-
cult to evolve doctrines describing and balancing such use-claims. Added 
to this is the issue of balancing the interests of multiple yet rivalrous us-
ers: ‘Problems concerned with the sharing of water supplies and joint uti-
lization of river systems are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution, 
involving as they do a complex interplay of diverse interests’ concluded 
Lon Fuller in a sociological analysis of western American water law.5 
The problem is complicated by the obvious relationship between land and the wa-
ter that runs through, under, or over it. Thus, Megarry and Wade, in the leading 
text on English real property law, say this: 
A landowner [at common law] has no property in water which either per-
colates through his land or flows through it in a defined channel. In the 
case of percolating water, at common law the landowner could draw any 
or all of it off without regard to the claims of neighbouring owners  . . . . 
 
In the case of water flowing through a defined channel, even at common 
law the riparian owner (the owner of the land through which the water 
flows) could not always take all the water . . . .6 
 
 3. Id. (citing Alfred F. Beckett Ltd. v Lyons (1967) Ch 449, 481G–482A (U.K.); Attorney-General 
ex rel Yorkshire Derwent Trust Ltd. v Brotherton (1992) 1 AC (HL) 425, 441A (Eng.); WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 14 (1753)). 
 4. GRAY, supra note 2, at 24-25. 
 5. JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 2 (2004) (citing L. 
L. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STANFORD L. REV. 1021, 1042 (1965)). See generally id. at 2, n.2; A. 
S. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES (4th ed. 1979). 
 6. SIR ROBERT MEGARRY & H. W. R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65 (5th ed. 
1984) (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, the English law historically came to the conclusion that “[i]nland water 
(whether a river or lake) is considered to be merely ‘a species of land’, in that law-
yers regard such areas of water as simply areas of ‘land covered with water.’”7 
The experience of other jurisdictions reveals a similar development of water 
law so as to suit unique social and economic circumstances and physical condi-
tions.8 In those parts of the world which received the common law, water law be-
gan with the English position and was adapted over time to local needs. Scott S. 
Slater, writes: 
As our living and working environments are subject to continuous altera-
tion by the forces of nature and humanity, there are corresponding im-
pacts on where we find water and how we use it. Thus, it is often stated 
that a good water resource allocation law must be flexible and susceptible 
to effective conflict resolution in an evolutionary world or face being dis-
carded as outdated. Just as frequently, it is stated that the basis of any ef-
fective water resource allocation system is the need for certainty. Simply, 
if there are no assurances that the rules which determine ownership, allo-
cation, and regulation of property today will also govern conduct tomor-
row, a socially unacceptable waste of economic resources will result. No 
certainty, no investment. No investment, no economic growth and stabil-
ity. This leaves us with an interesting paradox: A good law that seeks to 
allocate a scarce resource must provide for change and must at the same 
time provide certainty.9 
Property, both as a concept and as a legal vehicle used for the allocation of the 
use of scarce resources, seeks to achieve Slater’s twin objectives—certainty and 
adaptability—for a system of water law. As such, it underpins every method yet 
devised by any legal system for allocating the water resource.10 Property can ensure 
security of the entitlement to water, however that is defined, and good use of that 
resource, whatever that might mean. It can also adapt that allocation to changing 
circumstances, be they social, economic, political, or environmental.11 
 
 7. GRAY, supra note 2, at 25 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 18). 
 8. See generally DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN 
WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 2 (1986); WATER & POWER: A CALIFORNIA HEIST (Jigsaw 
Productions/National Geographic Documentary Films Jan. 23, 2017). 
 9. See 1 SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY § 1.02 (2017) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 10. See id. For the proprietary nature of Australian entitlements see ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 158 (Austl.); Michael Mckenzie, Water Rights in NSW: Proper-
ly Property?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 443, 443-44 (2009). See generally D. E. Fisher, Water Law, The High 
Court and Techniques of Judicial Reasoning, 27 ENV’T AND PLANNING L. J. 85 (2010). 
 11. See Dolores Rey et al., Role of Economic Instruments in Water Allocation Reform: Lessons from 
Europe, INT’L J. OF WATER RES. DEV. 224, 224-25 (2018). 
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Over time, then, different legal systems developed different approaches to al-
locating water. Every system took as its starting point the definition of a proprie-
tary interest in the resource.12 The first effort at defining a proprietary water right 
came from English common law judges, drawing upon the Roman law legacy of 
rights in water.13 In countries tracing their modern origins to the age of English 
colonization, such as the United States and Australia, the common law struggled to 
deal with the way in which property might be held in water. The struggle focused 
primarily on the tension between whether a land-holder whose land abutted run-
ning water (the “riparian holder”) would have a right paramount to any other right, 
including prior use, and giving paramountcy to a prior user.14 Many nations ulti-
mately settled on the system known as riparian rights, which, as we have noted, 
treated water flowing over land as if it were simply land. A riparian rights system 
provides two important rights in respect of such landholding: flow and abstraction. 
Megarry and Wade provide succinct summaries of the riparian rights of flow and 
abstraction; the former this way: 
[The riparian titleholder] is entitled to the flow of water through the land 
unaltered in volume or quality, subject to ordinary and reasonable use by 
the upper riparian owners, though he has no right to object to the level of 
the water being lowered unless this causes damage or a nuisance. He is 
bound by corresponding obligations to the lower riparian owners.15 
And the riparian right of abstraction as 
[t]he ordinary and reasonable use which at common law a riparian owner 
was entitled to make of the water flowing through his land was— 
(i) the right to take and use all water necessary for ordinary purposes 
connected with his riparian tenement (such as for watering his cattle 
or for domestic purposes, or, possibly, in some manufacturing dis-
tricts, for manufacturing purposes), even though this completely ex-
hausted the stream; and 
(ii) the right to use the water for extraordinary purposes connected with 
his riparian tenement, provided the use was reasonable and the water 
was restored substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in 
 
 12. See ALASTAIR R. LUCAS, SECURITY OF TITLE IN CANADIAN WATER RIGHTS 7 (1990); 
David R. Percy, Responding to Water Scarcity in Western Canada, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2091, 2094 (2005) 
[hereinafter Percy, Water Scarcity]; DAVID R. PERCY, THE FRAMEWORK OF WATER RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION IN CANADA 12-13 (1988) [hereinafter PERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION]. 
 13. See GETZLER, supra note 5, at 9. See also Joshua Getzler, Roman Ideas of Landownership, in 
LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 81, 86-87 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998); Joshua 
Getzler, Theories of Property and Economic Development, 26 J. INTERDISCIP. HIST. 639, 651-52 (1996). 
 14. See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095; PERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION, 
supra note 12, at 5-9. 
 15. MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 6, at 66 (internal citations omitted). 
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character. Such purposes included irrigation and (in all districts) 
manufacturing purposes, such as for cooling apparatus. The amount 
by which the flow might be diminished was a question of degree in 
each case.16 
 
The riparian owner of only one bank of a non-tidal watercourse enjoyed ripar-
ian rights up to the middle of the stream.17 If the waters were tidal, the Crown or 
State was entitled to the foreshore (the land between the ordinary high and low 
water marks), negating any natural riparian rights (although even in the case of tid-
al waters it was possible for riparian rights to exist).18 Whatever rights to water 
that did exist depended, then, upon the holding of riparian land (that covered by 
water).19 This tied whatever rights the common law recognized in water, which was 
something less than a proprietary interest, to the estate or interest (ownership) in 
the riparian land. 
Riparian rights worked well in water rich England, achieving for the most part 
Slater’s twin objectives of certainty and adaptability.20 However, the riparian rights 
system proved unadaptable to some of those places into which the common law 
flowed through the British acquisition of sovereignty. This was especially so in arid 
and semi-arid regions, such as the southwestern United States and most of Austral-
ia.21 The climatic, hydrological, and environmental similarities between the two 
regions mean that they are relevant comparators for the assessment of water enti-
tlement reforms, from both a policy and a legal perspective. 
California, for instance, has a “‘Mediterranean’ climate characterized by warm, 
dry summers and mild winters.” Most precipitation falls in the winter as rain and 
snow, and about 60% of it evaporates or is transpired by trees and vegetation.22 Of 
that left, roughly seventy-five million acre-feet per average year flows into water-
ways and groundwater aquifers and ultimately becomes available to use in homes, 
as irrigation for farmland, by industry, and in the environment.23 This is achieved 
through a major system of water transfer—a massive system of dams, reservoirs, 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 67 (internal citations omitted) (riparian rights accrue by virtue of holding riparian 
land—they are not created by grant or conveyance). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. LUCAS, supra note 12, at 5-8. 
 21. Id. at 11-14; Sandford D. Clark & Ian A. Renard, The Riparian Doctrine and Australian Legis-
lation, 7 MELB. U. L. REV. 475, 477-79 (1970). 
 22. California Water 101, WATER EDUC. FOUND., https://www.watereducation.org/photo-
gallery/california-water-101 (last visited May 30, 2019). See also CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., 
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE SCIENCE AND DATA FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2-3 (2015), 
https://water.ca.gov/LegacyFiles/climatechange/docs/CA_Climate_Science_and_Data_Final_Release_
June_2015.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
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aqueducts and canals—from northern California, which has 75% of California’s 
available water, to the south, where 80% of the urban and agricultural water de-
mand occurs.24 California’s economy of $2.7 billion USD annually sits behind only 
the United States itself, China, Japan and Germany,25 and it “depends [entirely] on 
the development and management of water.”26 
Similarly, the Australian state of South Australia’s climate has traditionally 
been described as Mediterranean, with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers.27 
This description, however, is really only appropriate to the southern settled areas, 
those lying below the 34° latitude mark, and even then, generally only in the areas 
closest to the Southern Ocean and the two gulfs of St. Vincent and Spencer.28 This 
southern area is itself subject to seasonal fluctuations in both temperature and rain-
fall, owing to the weather influences of the dry, desert-like continental interior to 
the north and the Southern Ocean to the south.29 
South Australia relies upon one river, the Murray, for 48.7% of its water sup-
ply.30 Like California, the region depends upon large reservoirs within the major 
Metropolitan area of Adelaide, which contribute 44% of the water supply.31 Ade-
laide’s reservoirs are largely fed by run-off from the higher rainfall catchment of 
the Mount Lofty Ranges and top-up water pumped from the River Murray in drier 
years.32 Groundwater contributes 5.4% of the state’s water supply, largely in the 
rural regions, with 1.9% of supply coming from desalinated seawater.33 
In recent years, South Australia has experienced “unprecedented[ly] dry 
weather patterns,” likely a result of climate change.34 Long periods of low rainfall 
have reduced flows into storages, rivers, watercourses and groundwater. “Flows in-
to the River Murray have been at their lowest since records began, 118 years ago.”35 
Within the state there has been a long history of over-allocation and over-use of 
water from various sources.36 The decline in both the quantity and quality of water 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. California’s Economy Passes UK’s to Become World’s Fifth Biggest, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/04/california-economy-uk-fifth-largest. 
 26. California Water 101, supra note 22. 
 27. TREVOR GRIFFIN & MURRAY MCCASKILL, ATLAS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 50 (1986). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Water Sources, SOUTH AUSTL. WATER CORP., https://www.sawater.com.au/community-
and-environment/our-water-and-sewerage-systems/water-sources (last visited May 30, 2019). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. See Groundwater Use, AUSTL. GOVT. GEOSCIENCE AUSTL., http://www.ga.gov.au/
scientific-topics/water/groundwater/basics/groundwater-use (last visited June 22, 2019). 
 34. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., OFFICE FOR WATER SECURITY, WATER FOR GOOD: A PLAN TO 
ENSURE OUR WATER FUTURE TO 2050 at 15 (2010). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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sourced from the River Murray has further complicated the water situation for 
South Australia.37 In both California and South Australia, the ongoing effects of 
climate change will only exacerbate the already limited supply of surface water.38 
Given the paucity of surface flowing water in both the southwestern United 
States and in Australia, strict adherence to riparian rights would have resulted in 
much land going entirely without water.39 For that reason, systems of allocation 
which allowed water to be used on land otherwise entirely unconnected to any 
flowing water—non-riparian land—emerged from economic and social exigencies.40 
Despite the development of new allocation systems, disputes in both the Unit-
ed States and in Australia remain frequent, ranging from the nature and content of 
water entitlements to federalism disputes between the national and state govern-
ments. In the United States, a recently resolved conflict over control of water re-
sources concerned the 1986 U.S.-California agreement over the Central Valley 
Project and State Water Projects.41 In Australia, the administration of the Murray-
Darling Basin pursuant to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement (the Australian 
equivalent of the 1986 U.S.-California agreement) continues to be a point of ten-
sion between the Commonwealth (federal) government and the south-eastern 
states (South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland).42 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 22, at 1; GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., OFFICE 
FOR WATER SECURITY, supra note 34. 
 39. See LUCAS, supra note 12, at 1-15. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee Editorial Bd., California Water Wars Would Get Crazy Complicated if 
Trump Administration Dives In, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 31, 2018) https://www.sacbee.com/
opinion/editorials/article217621920.html. See also Agreement Between the United States of America and 
the Department of Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of the Central 
Valley Project and the State Water Project, U.S.-CA, Nov. 24, 1986, No. 7-07-20-W0551, 
https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-Pages/Programs/State-Water-
Project/Files/Coordinated-Agreement-between-Reclamation-and-DWR.pdf; Press Release, Agreement 
Between U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of Water Resources Supported by 
Public Water Agencies, Westlands Water District (Dec. 12, 2018) https://wwd.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/VA-Joint-Contractor-Press-Release.pdf. 
 42. The state of South Australia is at the bottom of the Murray-Darling Basin, an area just over 
1 million square kilometers in area with a diverse range of landscapes, ecosystems, land uses, and cli-
mates ranging from tropical north to temperate south. The River Murray, measuring 2,500 kilometers 
in length, is the longest river in the country and makes up a significant component of the 3,750 kilome-
ter combined Murray-Darling river system. The Basin has, since European settlement, been the source 
of many disputes. A good history of the Basin and its problems can be found in DANIEL CONNELL, 
WATER POLITICS IN THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN (2007). The Murray-Darling Basin Authority was 
established pursuant to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, which appears in Water Act 2007 (Cth) 
sch 1 (Austl.). On January 23, 2018 the South Australian state government initiated a Royal Commis-
sion to investigate the operations and effectiveness of the Murray-Darling Basin system, an unusual 
move given only one-seventh of the basin is within the State’s jurisdiction. The allocation and use of 
River Murray water upstream of South Australia and the perception within that state that that was hav-
ing a deleterious effect on the state’s water supply was a significant issue prompting the establishment 
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The modern disputes in California and South Australia stem from the systems 
of water law that replaced riparian rights in these very un-English regions. In the 
United States, a system known as ‘prior appropriation’ took root in the southern 
and western states.43 Some regions adopted a hybrid of riparianism and prior ap-
propriation.44 Australia, along with some American states such as California,45 es-
tablished a system of “state ownership” that largely replaced riparianism.46 These 
systems sought new ways to allocate the water resource. The prior appropriation 
system prioritized the use of water over the attachment of that use to land, while 
the state ownership system relied upon the state to allocate use according to need, 
but typically tied any allocation to an underlying estate in land.47 Over the last 
twenty-five years in Australia, the original adaptation of riparian rights to the arid 
climate has undergone further modification, with State governments experiment-
ing with the separation of the water allocation and use right from an underlying 
estate in land. While this did not change the appropriative right that resulted from 
earlier modifications, it did allow for the transferability of water free of an underly-
ing interest in land.48 
The American and Australian adaptations have generally worked well. Still, 
the protection of an allocation in the hands of a grantee—Slater’s certainty49—and 
the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, both in terms of use and in relation 
 
of the Royal Commission. Details on the Murray-Darling Basin Commission can be found at Murray-
Darling Basin Commission, https://www.mdbrc.sa.gov.au/ (last visited July 18, 2019). And in late Janu-
ary 2019, a report by the Australian Productivity Commission suggested that the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority should be broken up, arguing its responsibilities and powers created internal inconsistencies 
that were unable to be managed. See PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN PLAN: FIVE-
YEAR ASSESSMENT (Cth) No. 90 (Austl. 2018), https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/basin-
plan/report/basin-plan.pdf. 
 43. See DAVID H GETCHES, WATER LAW (3rd ed. 1997); Water Law: An Overview, THE 
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LAW CENTRE, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/water-law/ (last 
visited June 20, 2019); Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881 
(2000). 
 44. See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095. 
 45. CAL. WATER CODE, Stats. 1943, ch. 368, § 102. 
 46. See Thorpes Limited v. Grant Pastoral Company Proprietary Limited, (1955) 92 CLR 317 
(Austl.); Clark & Renard, supra note 21; D. Patrick James and Hubert Chanson, One Hundred Years+ of 
Riparian Legislation in New South Wales, 3 AUSTL. ENVTL. L. NEWS 39 (2000); Sandford D. Clark, The 
River Murray Question: Part I – Colonial Days, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 11 (1971); Sandford D. Clark, The 
River Murray Question: Part II – Federation, Agreement and Future Alternatives, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 215 
(1971); Ian A Renard, The River Murray Question: Part III – New Doctrines for Old Problems, 8 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 625 (1972). The same modifications were implemented in semi-arid parts of western Canada, 
such as Alberta and Saskatchewan: see PERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION, supra note 12. 
 47. See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095. 
 48. See PAUL T. BABIE, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF TRANSFERABLE WATER 
ENTITLEMENT SYSTEMS IN VICTORIA AND ALBERTA (1997). 
 49. See Slater, supra note 9, for a discussion of Slater’s twin objectives of certainty and adapta-
bility. 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
116 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 9:1 
 
to the protection of the environment, continue to vex governments. It is the very 
nature of defining a certain and adaptable property right in a fugacious resource 
that causes problems. Unlike land or tangible personal property, fugacious re-
sources such as water are difficult to “possess” in any traditional sense. The defini-
tion of a property right must depend on some other aspect, which has typically re-
solved itself into an allocation of a given volume of water over a given period of 
time.50 
The United States Court of Claims decision in Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc. 
v. United States51 demonstrates not only the difficulties involved in establishing wa-
ter allocations that are both certain and adaptable, but also the passions to which 
those difficulties can give rise. In that case, two very divergent routes were taken 
by groups claiming proprietary interests in water rights. One group in Oregon took 
up arms against the US federal government so as to vindicate their claimed 
rights.52 In a dispute focusing on protection of the environment and wildlife, 
armed militant ranchers protesting federal control of lands seized control of the 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge.53 But in New Mexico, the Sacramento Grazing 
Association (SGA) sought redress in the US federal courts.54 There, Judge Braden 
held “that SGA established. . . a property interest, recognized by New Mexico law, 
to make beneficial use of stock water sources in the Sacramento Allotment of the 
Lincoln National Forest.”55 That right “was abrogated by actions undertaken by the 
United States Forest Service (“USFS”), in violation of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”56 
Disputes such as those in Oregon and New Mexico raise a fundamental ques-
tion: is property the best way to achieve the objectives of adaptability and certainty 
as identified by Slater? This question takes on new significance in respect of the 
current vogue, both in the United States and in Australia, for the “unbundling” of 
entitlements to water.57 This involves not only the separation of water allocation 
 
 50. ROBERT E. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, VOL. 1, 287-300 (1967). 
 51. See Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 168 (2017). 
 52. Id. at 171. 
 53. See Cat Wise, Cranes, Curlews, And Cows—The Delicate Debate Over Oregon’s Federal Lands, 
PBS NEWS (May 24, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cranes-curlews-and-cows-the-delicate-
debate-over-oregons-federal-lands/. 
 54. See Josh Buettner, New Mexico ranchers say battle over water rights jeopardizes their livelihood, 
PBS NEWS (January 4, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/new-mexico-ranchers-say-battle-
over-water-rights-jeopardizes-their-livelihood; Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 
175 (2010). 
 55. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, 135 Fed. Cl. at 171. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Michael Young, et. al., Unbundling Water Rights: A Blueprint for Development of Robust 
Water Allocation Systems in the Western United States, 15-01 NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y 
SOLUTIONS 10-11 (2015). 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
Fall 2019] Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia 117 
 
from land, but also the further division of the allocation itself for different uses.58 
In other words, there is a further fragmentation—unbundling—of an already frag-
mented right. Property confers on its holder the power to choose, as mediated by 
the public interest, with the state taking the central role in determining what the 
public interest is and how to ensure the protection and certainty of the individual 
right. But the more fragmented, or unbundled the rights available in the same re-
source, the more difficult it becomes for any one holder of property—of choice—to 
make a decision about the beneficial use of that resource. 
In short, government seeks to ensure a balance between private and public in-
terest.59 That being the case, it becomes important to consider where the state 
draws the line between the individual and the community and where the unbun-
dling of water allocations allows that line to be drawn. Such line drawing requires a 
framework within which to consider the allocative mechanism implemented. In this 
article, we argue that striking that balance means considering the tension between 
what Garrett Hardin seminally called the tragedy of the commons and Michael 
Heller’s ground-breaking revelation of the anticommons tragedy.60 Somewhere be-
tween those two points one finds the optimal balance between individual and 
community, between aggregated and disaggregated, or unbundled rights. That is 
the theoretical frame that we propose to apply to a system that seeks to allocate wa-
ter in pursuit of a policy of unbundled rights. 
We apply this frame to a case study of the current unbundling process in the 
Australian state of South Australia. Still, our approach can be applied to any water 
law system in which unbundling has been pursued, informing the definition and 
allocation of a proprietary right in water. For example, California is in the process 
of implementing modifications to its water allocation law that would allow for a 
revised groundwater market.61 In doing so, it should consider the potential for an-
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Paul Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism and the Future: Four Reflections on Private 
Property and Climate Change, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 527 (2010); see also Paul Babie, Choices that Matter: 
Three Propositions on the Individual, Private Property, and Anthropogenic Climate Change, 22 COLO. J. OF 
INT’L ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y 323 (2011); see also Paul Babie, Sovereignty as Governance: An Organising 
Theme for Australian Property Law, 36 U. OF N.S.W. L. J. 1075 (2013); see also Paul Babie, The Spatial: A 
Forgotten Dimension of Property, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 323 (2013). 
 60. For the tragedy of the commons, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). And for the tragedy of the anticommons, see Michael A Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 
(1998). 
 61. See Dickinson Groundwater Management Act, Cal. Assemb. Bill 1739, Ch. 347 (Cal. Stat. 
2014), Pavley Groundwater Management Act, Cal. S. B. 1168, Ch. 346 (Cal. Stat. 2014), and Cal. S. B. 
1319, Ch. 346 (Cal. Stat. 2014), collectively known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
(SGMA), Cal. Water Code §10730 (2015). See also Nell Green Nylen et al., Trading Sustainably: Critical 
Considerations for Local Groundwater Markets Under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 
WHEELER WATER INST., CTR. FOR LAW, ENERGY & THE ENV’T, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L.  
(June 2017), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CLEE_Trading-Sustainably_
2017-06-21.pdf. 
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ticommons tragedies that may follow the further fragmentation of an already frag-
mented resource. Our assessment of South Australia demonstrates that market ac-
tors seem reluctant to take up smaller and smaller bundles of rights in relation to 
water. We develop, in response, a legal methodological approach for the considera-
tion of water allocation systems in arid and semi-arid environments where the wa-
ter resource is scarce and where the bundles of rights in that resource are increas-
ingly fragmented. 
The article contains three parts. Part I considers the theoretical nature of 
property and the way in which it might be extended to water through “unbundling” 
of water entitlements. Part II presents unbundling as it has been implemented in 
South Australia. This allows us to assess the extent to which the stated policy of 
certainty and transferability of entitlements said to be the product of unbundling 
has been achieved, and the extent to which this is a desirable outcome. The Con-
clusion offers some reflections on the potential for unbundling water entitlements 
in arid or semi-arid environments. The South Australian experience reveals a reluc-
tance to embrace this approach, both on the part of the state in terms of imple-
menting, and on the part of market actors holding existing proprietary interests in 
water. This reluctance ought to be viewed by other jurisdictions as a cautionary tale 
about the effectiveness or efficiency of unbundling. Indeed, what we show is that 
such efforts may not only fail to provide efficiency gains, but also, and much more 
worryingly, may drive anticommons tragedies which entirely inhibit any beneficial 
use. We propose that our anecdotal and theoretical analysis of South Australia re-
quires empirical research to test our conclusions, both in respect to the operation of 
the water market and as to the behavior of market actors. 
I.  PROPERTY IN WATER 
A.  Commons versus Anticommons 
A legal system might allocate the use and control of water according to one of 
two polar opposite forms of property: either, at one extreme, commons property, 
or at the other, private property. In this section we examine not only commons and 
private property, but also two specific difficulties that can arise from the use of one 
or the other. A ‘tragedy of the commons’ can result from the sole use of commons 
property,62 while a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ can follow the extreme fragmenta-
tion of the use of a resource pursuant to private property.63 We turn first to com-
mons property. 
In 1968, Garrett Hardin explored the nature of commons property which, as a 
matter of theoretical content, explains the absence of exclusionary rights in respect 
 
 62. Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244. 
 63. Heller, supra note 60, at 622. 
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of a given resource.64 Instead, commons property pertains where everyone has the 
privilege of use and no one has the right to exclude others in relation to that re-
source. “People are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, with whatev-
er objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons].”65 The protec-
tions otherwise afforded the holders of private property are not extended, in the 
case of commons property, to the resource in question.66 
One rarely finds the ideal type of commons property identified by Heller in a 
real-world legal system.67 Rather, the ideal type demonstrates that in the case of a 
true commons in any resource, where no one person has the power to exclude the 
use of others, the rational person concludes that it is best to make as much use of 
the resource as one can before it is depleted by the use of others.68 Put another 
way, there is no benefit to any one person to conserve a resource in a scenario 
where others are making maximal use of it.69 Thus, should too many people hold 
truly commons property in a scarce resource, without the power to exclude, a trag-
edy of the commons occurs.70 
For Hardin, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”71 Hardin would sub-
sequently write that the tragedy arises in the “unmanaged commons”—in other 
words, Hardin suggested that a commons may operate efficiently if some regula-
tion is established to govern the use made by those who enjoy access to the com-
mons—which results 
because it rewards individual exploiters for making the wrong decisions—
wrong for the group as a whole, and wrong for themselves, in the long 
run. Freedom in the commons does not produce a stable prosperity.72 
In some ways, though, what Hardin identified was nothing new. In the Politics, 
Aristotle wrote 
 
 64. Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244. 
 65. FRANK I. MICHELMAN, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: 
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (J. Rowland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982). 
 66. J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 110 (1996). 
 67. The “ideal-typic” and “ideal types” phraseology is coined by Michael A. Heller, Three Faces 
of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 418, 422, 432-433 (2000). See also Michael A. Heller, The 
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 116, 1168 n. 15 (1999). 
 68. Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Heller, supra note 60, at 677 (1998) (“A tragedy of the commons can occur when too many in-
dividuals have privileges of use in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting sepa-
rately, may collectively overconsume scarce resources. Each individual finds that she benefits by con-
sumption, even though she imposes larger costs on the community.”) 
 71. Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244. 
 72. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, 9 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 199, 199 (1994). 
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[t]hat which is common to the greatest number is given the least care, for 
they care most for that which is their own, and less for that which is 
common to all, or they care just for whichever part falls on them individ-
ually. Among other reasons, they neglect it even more when they think 
that someone else is caring for it, as among the staff of the household, 
when sometimes those who give bad service are greater in number than 
those who do not. And further, for this reason, each citizen has a thou-
sand sons, these not belonging to each individually, instead being the son 
of everyone equally, so that each is neglected with equal measure.73 
In this passage, as in Hardin, we see that the tragedy occurs when the subject en-
joys the benefits without the burden of responsibility. Paradoxically, though a per-
son might have an interest in maintaining the condition from which to enjoy the 
benefits, the burden does not fall on that person to do so. Therefore, the responsi-
bility is fulfilled by no one. 
Averting this tragedy involves ensuring that every person in the commons has 
something to protect. The way to do that is to confer upon each person a means of 
excluding others from access to and use of the resource said to belong to that per-
son.74 In other words, the answer is private property: the power, conferred by the 
state on individuals, to make use of a resource and to exclude others from that use, 
and to alienate that power to others at a time and in a way chosen by the holder of 
the original power of use and exclusion.75 
According to Hardin, the best ongoing protection for a resource involves a 
parcelling out of rights to that resource.76 Fragmenting a common resource both 
spatially (of the resource itself) and legally (as to the rights available to it as pro-
tected by law) confers upon individuals the ability to control use and exclude oth-
ers from use.77 But is such fragmentation, both of the resource and of the power to 
exclude from its use, the best outcome available? Others have questioned whether 
the adoption of private property represents the sole method of mitigating the trag-
edy of the commons;78 indeed, even Hardin himself reconsidered his confidence in 
private property.79 
In 1998, thirty years after Hardin’s seminal work, Michael Heller suggested a 
“mirror image” to the tragedy of the (unregulated) commons—the tragedy of the 
 
 73. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1261b (Kyriaco Nikias trans. 2019). 
 74. Hardin, supra note 60, at 1245. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Heller, supra note 60, at 651, for an explanation of the spatial-legal dichotomy. 
 78. Lubna Hasan, Fifty Years of Debate on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons – A Reflection 2, 9-10 
(2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3315183 (providing a recent summary of 
the positions taken by those who question Hardin’s approach). 
 79. See Hardin, supra note 72, at 199. 
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anticommons.80 Heller’s work posits a form of property known as “anticommons” 
and the tragedy that follows from its surfeit in a legal system. Here we briefly con-
sider these claims in turn. 
Consider first the concept of anticommons property. Walking down a post-
Soviet Moscow street in the late 1990s, Heller noticed empty storefronts, explain-
ing this outcome as the result of circumstances in which 
one owner may be endowed initially with the right to sell, another to re-
ceive sale revenue, and still others to lease, receive lease revenue, occupy, 
and determine use. Each owner can block the others from using the space 
as a storefront. No one can set up shop without collecting the consent of 
all of the other owners.81 
This represents a case of anticommons property, in which “initial endowments are 
created as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in scarce 
resources . . . . In an anticommons . . . multiple owners are each endowed with the 
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege 
of use.”82 
We might consider anticommons property as private property on steroids: “a 
property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a 
scarce resource,”83 inhibiting effective and efficient use. The most extreme form of 
anticommons private property is that pertaining to pharmaceutical patents—many 
individual holders enjoy a right of exclusion in relation to a different component of 
one pharmaceutical product. The multiple rights of exclusion mean that no one pa-
tent holder can effectively and efficiently develop the pharmaceutical product, thus 
denying both the patent-holders of the financial benefit of the right held, and the 
market of a potentially beneficial medicine.84 Yet, “for most resources that people 
care about, some level of use is preferable to non-use, and an anticommons regime 
is a threat to, rather than the epitome of, optimal use.”85 We might plot what we 
know about commons property, private property and anticommons property along 
a continuum, as seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
 80. Heller, supra note 60. Michael Heller fully developed the concept of the anticommons trag-
edy in MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2010). 
 81. Heller, supra note 60, at 623. 
 82. Id. at 623-24. 
 83. Id. at 667 (emphasis in original removed). 
 84. HELLER, supra note 80, at 49-78. 
 85. Heller, supra note 60, at 669. 
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FIGURE 1. CONTINUUM OF PRIVATE PROPERTY86 
 
 
 
As one plots a system of property towards the anticommons end of the con-
tinuum, what one really finds is a highly fragmented system of private property 
rights in one resource. At this end of the continuum, what Heller calls “extreme 
private property” in the diagram, full exclusion refers to the fact that actor A, B, C, 
etc., has a full exclusionary right in relation to one discrete element of the resource 
symbolized by the full cell. This contrasts with the commons end of the continu-
um, in which the absence of private property means that each of A, B, C, etc., has 
no right to exclude any others entitled to make use of the commons, again repre-
sented by the full cell. When a situation at the anticommons end emerges in rela-
tion to a given resource, either as a consequence of the state creating and confer-
ring private property, or of individuals dividing existing private property interests, 
the potential for what Heller calls an anticommons tragedy looms. “When there are 
too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a 
tragedy of the anticommons.”87 Here, then, “too many individuals have rights of ex-
clusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting sepa-
rately, may collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a 
social optimum.”88 Moreover, and more worrying, 
[o]nce anticommons property appears, neither markets nor subsequent 
regulation will reliably convert it into useful private property, even if the 
property rights are “clearly defined” and contracts are subject to the “rule 
of law.” Transaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may prevent eco-
nomically justified conversion from taking place. Over time, markets may 
develop formal or informal mechanisms that allow rights bundling entre-
preneurs to assemble private or quasi-private property. More directly, 
governments can tinker with the rights regime through policy reforms to 
change individual incentives in favor of bundling, or they can risk the in-
stability that comes from revoking excessive rights of exclusion. Howev-
 
 86. Adapted from Heller, supra note 67, at 1167. 
 87. Heller, supra note 60, at 624 (emphasis in original). 
 88. Id. at 677. 
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er . . . once anticommons property has emerged, both markets and gov-
ernments may fail to rebundle it into usable private property.89 
It is for this reason, Heller argues, that 
[g]overnments must take care to avoid creating anticommons property ac-
cidentally when they define new property rights. One path to well-
functioning private property is to convey a core bundle of rights to a sin-
gle owner, rather than rights of exclusion to multiple owners. Subsequent-
ly, owners of standard bundles may fragment their ownership. Well-
functioning market legal systems allow this conversion, but have numer-
ous safeguard mechanisms to ensure that rights can be rebundled and the 
property can be put to use within a reasonable period. When these mech-
anisms fail, anticommons property can become entrenched, even in de-
veloped market economies.90 
The difficulty is that 
[b]oth theorists and practitioners assume that the key to creating private 
property is to define rights clearly, enforce contracts predictably, and let 
the market sort out entitlements. The experience of anticommons proper-
ty . . . suggests that the content of property bundles, and not just the clar-
ity of property rights, matters more than we have realized. We pay a high 
price when we inadvertently create anticommons property.91 
Heller’s conclusions about anticommons property and the potential for a trag-
edy of underuse stand in stark contrast to the trend of Australian policy, legal, and 
scholarly opinion about the packaging of proprietary rights in water. The Australi-
an objective seems to be an unbundling of property rights or entitlements to this 
scarce resource.92 This unbundling seems to be the very circumstance that will en-
sure not that the resource will be used efficiently, but rather that it will not be used 
at all. While it is uncertain that a tragedy either of the commons or of the anti-
commons will occur simply because either commons or anticommons property ex-
ists,93 as we show in Part II, the risk of such a tragedy following the emergence of 
these types of property is significant, and the consequences dire. 
Hardin and Heller stake out positions at either end of a very wide spectrum—
they theorize two different types of property and two different types of tragedy. At 
Hardin’s end of the spectrum we find commons property and the tragedy of the 
 
 89. Id. at 687-88. 
 90. Id. at 688. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See infra Section II.A (describing Australia’s evolving approach to the unbundling of water 
rights between 2004 and 2012). 
 93. HELLER, supra note 80, at 676-78. 
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commons. At Heller’s end, anticommons property, or more accurately, hyper-
private property and the anticommons tragedy. 
Of course, almost no cases of a perfect commons or of an anticommons prop-
erty system will ever be found in any real-world scarce resource. As we have noted, 
they are ideal types. The point, though, is that a system of property or entitlement 
in a scarce resource will require pegging somewhere along that spectrum. Making 
the decision as to where to place those entitlements carries consequences for the 
use of that resource. That pegging is really another way of saying that a decision 
has to be made between prioritizing the individual—at the Heller end—and the 
collective or community—the Hardin end.94 Too far towards the commons end of 
the spectrum and wasteful use will occur; too far towards the anticommons end and 
the opposite, a complete lack of any use whatsoever, follows. As we show in the 
next section, and in Part II, this tension is perhaps most marked in the debate over 
bundling or unbundling allocations in water. The question is a simple one: have 
governments that have engaged in unbundling achieved the correct blend of pro-
prietary entitlements, taking account of the commons and anticommons tragedies 
at either end of the property continuum? Through an assessment of the legislative, 
policy, and anecdotal evidence, we explore the extent to which unbundling has 
been achieved in Australian water law, using South Australia as a case study. We 
then examine the extent to which this development carries with it the potential for 
an anticommons tragedy. 
B.  Bundled versus Unbundled 
The tension between commons and anticommons property plays out in rela-
tion to the current trend away from bundled entitlements to water. As we noted in 
the Introduction, for the most part, government-established and enforced water-
allocation systems seek to balance two competing goals. They work to separate wa-
ter allocations from the necessity of owning land while avoiding commons property 
and its attendant difficulties.95 Most modern water-allocation systems respond to 
circumstances—sometimes found in prior-appropriation systems—in which conflict 
among users and inefficient use by those users ensues from a lack of clarity over the 
rights held.96 Governments intervene so as to encourage markets in water and to 
ensure the viability and functioning of those markets.97 
It comes as no surprise, then, as we have shown in Part I, that most govern-
ments move away from commons property as concerns water allocation, and to-
wards systems of private property in water. In doing so, such water allocation sys-
tems move along the continuum outlined above towards anticommons property. 
 
 94. See Hardin, supra note 72, at 199; see also Heller, supra note 60, at 623-24. 
 95. See supra Introduction. 
 96. See Young, supra note 57, at 1. 
 97. See id. at 7. 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
Fall 2019] Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia 125 
 
Unbundling, as we have discussed above,98 seeks simultaneously to define the enti-
tlement to water and its separation into constituent parts, making it, so it is 
claimed, “easier to value, monitor, and trade:”99 
In an unbundled system, the component of a water right that defines the 
long-term interest is defined as a share. The water that is available for use 
within a time period (e.g., year or season) is then defined as a seasonal al-
location. A share can be thought of as a perpetual entitlement to a portion 
of any water that is allocated for use. A seasonal allocation can be thought 
of as an acre foot of water available in a particular season. In an unbun-
dled system, this acre foot can be used, traded, or, with adjustment for 
losses, saved for use in a subsequent season. The number of seasonal allo-
cations a person receives is a function of the number of shares he or she 
holds in that particular water resource. When an allocation is made, it is 
recorded in a water account, but not recorded on a share certificate.100 
“Priority shares” within the system ensure that those who hold allocations pri-
or to unbundling retain that priority, and “seasonal or annual allocations” are made 
according to the number of shares held.101 Thus, shares and allocation are separat-
ed, which “enables two forms of trading: (1) share trading, which facilitates effi-
cient management of risk and investment and (2) allocation trading, which ensures 
that all water is put to its best economic use.”102 
A key component of an unbundled allocation of water is the absence of a 100% 
beneficial use requirement. Rather, a clearly-defined water right may allow a holder 
of an allocation to use it (either in its entirety or not), save it, or sell it, each de-
pending upon seasonal conditions and circumstances.103 Water resource sharing 
plans make clear how water is to be used, leaving little to judgement and dispute 
requiring judicial resolution.104 Established by water boards (which remove much 
dispute-resolution from courts),105 such plans “must address how much water must 
be (1) set aside for conveyance and meeting of downstream obligations, (2) allocat-
ed to shareholders, and (3) defined as flood water and, hence, not held as a 
right.”106 In addition to this, such plans make provision for water that is to be re-
tained in system for the environment.107 Bolstering the certainty achieved by re-
 
 98. See supra Section I.A. 
 99. Young, supra note 57, at 11. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 12. 
 103. Id. at 11, 16-17. 
 104. Id. at 12. 
 105. Id. at 22-23. 
 106. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). 
 107. Id. at 19-21. 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
126 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 9:1 
 
source sharing plans, a Torrens Title-like register of water entitlements allows for 
ease of determining the holder of relevant water entitlements, and for establishing 
priority amongst them and for facilitating their transfer.108 
The question, of course, is whether the policy of unbundling works—does it 
move too far along the continuum of property, thus running the risk of a tragedy of 
the anticommons? In partial answer to that question (partial, for reasons we will 
see), we turn now to the legal implementation of the theory and policy of unbun-
dling in South Australia. 
II.  UNBUNDLING WATER ENTITLEMENTS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The climate of the Australian continent is varied, though it is for the most part 
characteristically dry. Though an extensive agricultural economy developed in the 
colonial period, the rainfall upon which it depends can be unreliable. Droughts are 
frequent and severe.109 The Australian condition is captured most famously in the 
works of the nation’s foremost novelist, Patrick White. The landscape serves White 
as a device for exploration of the theme of reckoning with hardship, as when, gaz-
ing helplessly into the sky above her rural property, one of his characters ponders 
that 
[t]here would be rain perhaps, she felt.110 
But White’s surreality has been the harsh actuality of the Australian condition for 
generations of agriculturalists. This is especially true of South Australia, the vast 
majority of which is either arid or semi-arid.111 
 
 108. Id. at 13-15. Torrens title is a system of title to land by registration, whereby an estate or 
interest in land is created not by deed, as at common law, but through a legislatively defined process of 
registration. A system of title by registration, such as the Torrens title system, seeks to achieve three 
primary objectives: (i) establishing a register in which any person can determine the state of title to a 
given landholding simply be searching the register—this is known as the ‘mirror principle’, in the sense 
that the register provides an accurate ‘reflection’ of the state of title, (ii) drawing a ‘curtain’ around all 
prior dealings with the land, so that a person dealing in the land is bound only by those interests noted 
on the register at the relevant time—the ‘curtain principle’—and, (iii) a state guarantee of title, such 
that any person who suffers loss as a consequence of reliance on the register or as a result of the opera-
tion of the register may recover that loss from the state—the ‘guarantee principle’. The Torrens title 
system was created in South Australia in 1858 and has subsequently been adopted throughout Australia, 
most of Canada, and some other jurisdictions internationally, including some U.S. States. See John V. 
Orth & Paul T. Babie, The Troubled Boundaries of Torrens Indefeasibility: Lessons from Australia and the 
United States, 7 PROP. L. REV. 33 (Australia) (2017) (outlining systems of land title by registration, the 
origins of the Torrens system, and its spread to other jurisdictions). 
 109. Climate Change and Drought, CLIMATE COUNCIL (June 2018), 
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CC_MVSA0146-Fact-Sheet-Drought_
V2-FA_High-Res_Single-Pages.pdf. 
 110. PATRICK WHITE, THE TREE OF MAN 63 (1956). 
 111. Trevor Griffin & Murray McCaskill (eds) Atlas of South Australia, South Australian Gov-
ernment Printing Division and Wakefield Press 1986 at 50-51. 
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A.  Policy 
The state of South Australia has the unenviable title of being the driest state 
on the driest inhabited continent on earth.112 The latest State of Environment re-
port for South Australia paints a bleak picture for a state that already has water 
scarcity issues from time to time.113 “South Australia’s surface water and groundwa-
ter resources are under pressure from agriculture, industrial use, population 
growth, pollution, and climate change.”114 
Since 1990, the state has exhibited significant regional variation in rainfall 
trends. Winter rainfall has decreased in the state’s key southern agricultural regions 
by around 10−40 mm per decade, while tropically induced summer rainfall has in-
creased in the northern pastoral regions by up to 40−60 mm per decade. Although 
there has been some increase in extreme rainfall events, particularly in the state’s 
north, annual and spring rainfall across South Australia is projected to decline by 
between 5−15% by 2050 (relative to the baseline period 1986–2005).115 
There is a strong reliance on both the River Murray for industry, irrigation, 
and water supply to the state’s major city, Adelaide, and on groundwater supplies 
in the rural sector and rural towns.116 If the limited useable sources of water are to 
be available for use by both present and future generations and for environmental 
purposes, they must be rigorously managed with care and considerable foresight.117 
The systems set up under the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (South Aus-
tralia (SA)) for the licensing and approval of rights in relation to water are de-
signed to assist with the process of ensuring both present and future generations of 
South Australians have access to adequate water supplies. They clearly contemplate 
an unbundled approach to those water rights.118 
In 2012, the South Australian government issued its Policy on the Implementa-
tion of Unbundling Water Rights in South Australia, the stated purpose of which was 
“[t]o set out the principles and processes for determining the appropriate level and 
timing of unbundling of water rights for each prescribed water resource” and thus 
“respond to requirements for water planning under the COAG Water Reform 
 
 112. River Murray, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T AND WATER, 
https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray (last visited July 19, 2019). 
 113. S. AUSTL. ENV’T PROTECTION AUTH., STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 1-52 (7th 
ed. 2018) https://www.epa.sa.gov.au/soe-2018. 
 114. Id. at 27. 
 115. Id. at 15. 
 116. River Murray, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T AND WATER, 
https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray (last visited July 19, 2019). 
 117. See Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, ¶ 2, 2010. 
 118. Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). This unbundled approach was set up under 
Part 3 of the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 following amendments made to that Act by the 
Natural Resources Management (Water Resources and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2007. The amend-
ments were made, in part, to meet the State of South Australia’s obligations pursuant to the 1994 Inter-
governmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative. 
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agenda, National Water Initiative (NWI), in particular the NWI Guidelines for 
Water Planning and Management, as well as the Water Resource Plan Require-
ments in the Basin Plan.”119 The first step in this process involved amendments to 
the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA)120 which came into force on 1 July 
2009. The Act allows for five defined water entitlements, collectively defined by 
the generic term, “water management authorisation:”121 (i) water access entitle-
ments,122 (ii) water allocations,123 (iii) delivery capacity entitlements,124 (iv) water 
resource works approvals,125 and (v) site use approvals.126 The first three entitle-
ments were stated to be personal property, freely transferable as such, while the 
latter two remained attached to land.127 
In the 2012 Policy, however, the government stated that it had been “deter-
mined that apart from regulated river systems the applicability and benefits of un-
bundling water rights are less obvious.”128 The government noted that a number of 
questions remained about unbundling, namely 
 
 119. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., POLICY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNBUNDLING WATER 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1 (2012), https://www.waterconnect.sa.gov.au/Content/Publications/
DEWNR/Policy%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20Unbundling%20Water%20Rights
%20in%20South%20Australia.pdf. 
 120. Pursuant to the Natural Resources Management (Water Resources and Other Matters) Amend-
ment Act 2007 (South Australia). See also Natural Resources Management (General) Regulations 2005 (South 
Australia). 
 121. Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 3. 
 122. This is a water license providing an entitlement to the holder of the license to gain access to 
a share of water available in the consumptive pool or consumptive pools to which the license relates. See 
id. at s 146. 
 123. A water allocation is the amount of water that may be allocated to a particular license holder 
in relation to a defined water resource. See id. at s 152. 
 124. A delivery capacity entitlement is an entitlement held by a person enabling the transfer of 
the subject water to another under a water entitlements transfer scheme. See id. at s 164(k). 
 125. A water resource works approval is an approval for works and infrastructure related to the 
extraction and supply of water through bores, pumps, pipes, etc. See id. at s 159. 
 126. A site use approval is an approval specifying the purposes for which the water can be used, 
the place at which it can be used and the proposed extent, manner and rate of use of the water. For ex-
ample, the use of water supplied for irrigation purposes may be restricted to certain types of irrigation 
such as drip irrigation and night watering as a water conservation measure during the summer. See id. at 
s 164(a). 
 127. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 2. See also GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T OF ENV’T, 
WATER AND NAT. RESOURCES, UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS - GENERAL INFORMATION (2009), 
https://www.waterconnect.sa.gov.au/Content/Publications/DEWNR/Unbundling%20Water%20Rights
%20FAQ.pdf [hereinafter UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS - GENERAL INFORMATION]. 
 128. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 2. (“South Australia is committed to implementa-
tion of unbundling for surface water, watercourses and groundwater systems, where demonstrated to be 
feasible and of overall net benefit, in consultation with stakeholders on a case by case basis.”). The River 
Murray is just one of a number of regulated river systems across Australia. See, River Murray, GOV’T OF 
S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T AND WATER., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray 
(last visited July 19, 2019). 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
Fall 2019] Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia 129 
 
• Are there gaps in knowledge about the water resource that impact on 
determining consumptive pool boundaries? 
• What are the required water resource management arrangements and 
are they better supported by unbundling water rights? 
• Does unbundling streamline or complicate water resource manage-
ment, water rights administration and processes for water users? 
• Does unbundling facilitate water markets and water trade? This may 
depend on the complexity of water resource management issues, but 
can also depend on the maturity of the market and the level of un-
derstanding and confidence of the licensees. In addition, any assess-
ment should consider any advantages from expediting trade. 
• To what extent are other prescribed water resources within the same 
region unbundled? 
• To what extent are inter-catchment or inter-basin water transfers oc-
curring and what is the impact of potential different management ar-
rangements between these catchments? 
• Are there other outstanding issues that may need to be resolved prior 
to the introduction of unbundled water rights—such as conversion to 
volumetric allocations, addressing overallocation, dealing with unli-
censed water use, such as stock and domestic water use, or intercep-
tion and use by forestry? 
• Are there intergovernmental issues that need to be considered, such 
as the Border Groundwater Agreement,129 and the benefits of con-
sistency with interstate arrangements? 
• What are the current administrative practices and how will they have 
to change under an unbundled water rights system? Are there barri-
ers in terms of costs, skills, IT systems, etc.?130 
For these reasons, while unbundling has occurred in the River Murray Prescribed 
Watercourse and the Southern Basins and Musgrave Prescribed Wells Area (see 
Figure 2 for the South Australian water resource management areas),131 full un-
bundling across the state has yet to proceed. In the following section, we consider 
 
 129. The Border Groundwater Agreement is an agreement between the Australian states of Vic-
toria and South Australia. Along the border between the two states the only reliable source of water is 
groundwater. It is used for irrigation, industrial, stock and domestic supply and is the principal source 
of water for some of the townships in the border region. The Agreement seeks to ensure that the availa-
ble groundwater is shared equitably between the two states in an area that extends for 20 kilometers on 
either side of the border for a distance of 450 kilometers. Border Groundwaters Agreement - South Austral-
ia-Victoria, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/water/resources/border-
groundwaters-agreement (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
 130. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 4. See generally, UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS - 
GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 127. 
 131. Unbundling Water Rights, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/managing-
natural-resources/water/planning/water-licences-and-permits/unbundling-water-rights (last visited July 19, 
2019). 
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the legal framework of unbundling pursuant to the Natural Resources Management 
Act 2004 (SA), including subsequent amendments to the Act made in 2007 to im-
plement the requirements of the National Water Initiative. 
B.  Commonwealth Impetus: National Water Initiative 2004 
The allocation and regulation of water has been a problem in Australian law 
since the foundation of central governments after colonization.132 The problem of 
allocation is inherently one of the transferability of rights.133 The Roman legacy of 
riparian rights in English law was wholly unsuitable for the dry continent, since it 
restricted the allocation of rights to water to those who held the land on which the 
water was located, or to which it was connected.134 Water in Australia was not as 
abundant as it was in England, so the riparian doctrine created an irregular and in-
efficient distribution of access to the resource. It was clear from the establishment 
of the first farms in the colonies that water rights on the continent would have to 
be severed from rights in land in order to achieve an efficient allocation of the re-
source for agricultural use. An early attempt at centralizing the allocation of water 
rights is seen in the Victorian Irrigation Act 1886 (Victoria (Vic))135 which put rights 
in the use of water from a watercourse in the hands of the state, thus subordinating 
the rights of riparian landholders.136 
It took another century for the principle of the severance of water rights from 
land to be extended to water generally, rather than watercourses alone.137 The first 
step in the reform of Australian water rights was the 1994 Council of Australian 
Governments (‘CoAG’) Water Reform Framework.138 It was agreed by the state 
governments that they 
would implement comprehensive systems of water allocations or entitle-
ments backed by separation of water property rights from land title and 
clear specification of entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliabil-
ity, transferability and, if appropriate, quality . . .139 
 
 132. See Clark, supra note 46. 
 133. See BABIE, supra note 48. 
 134. On modern riparian doctrine and its history, see supra notes 42-46 and associated text. See 
also GETZLER, supra note 5, at 2. 
 135. Irrigation Act of 1886, 50 Vict. No. 898 (1886). 
 136. See JOHN TISDELL, JOHN WARD, AND TONY GRUDZINSKI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
WATER REFORM IN AUSTRALIA (TECHNICAL REPORT 02/5), 16 (Cooperative Research Centre for 
Catchment Hydrology, 2002). 
 137. See BABIE, supra note 48. 
 138. COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, WATER REFORM FRAMEWORK COMMUNIQUÉ 25 
FEBRUARY 1994, (Environment Australia, Marine and Water Division, 2004) http://www.ielrc.org/
content/e9401.pdf. 
 139. Id. at s 4(a). 
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The 1994 agreement is properly placed in the context of the liberalization of 
Australian macroeconomic policy in the 1980s.140 The reforms having exposed do-
mestic industry to foreign competition, the Government was concerned with mak-
ing Australian production efficient enough to compete with foreign industry.141 It 
was important to achieve the allocative efficiency of business inputs.142 Water was 
one such input, with particular importance for agricultural production, which is by 
far the largest use for water in Australia.143 The problem inherited from English 
law was that riparian rights created a rigid market for water (being connected with 
land), and so distorted the efficient allocation and use of water by irrigators and 
pastoralists. The economic effects put Australian production at a disadvantage. 
And this problem only became increasingly serious as “[m]arginally increasing 
costs of supply were exacerbated by an increasing demand for water resources, both 
in scale and diversity, particularly community demand for in-stream environmental 
objectives and consumer concern for improved quality of supply.”144 The CoAG 
agreement in 1994 sought to address the situation by creating a more competitive, 
integrated national water market.145 Thus, the creation of rights to water separated 
from rights to land (that is, the effective abolition of pure riparian doctrine) had the 
aim of maximising national income and welfare “within the social, physical and 
ecological constraints of catchments.”146 
In a way that neatly characterizes the relationship between the Australian 
states and the Federation, the Federal Government in 1995 tied the payment of 
transfers to the states (under the National Competition Policy) to their implemen-
tation of the principles of the CoAG agreement.147 In order to fulfil their obliga-
tion (and thus to secure the competitive funding), legislative reforms were passed 
 
 140. See TISDELL, WARD AND GRUDZINSKI, supra note 136, at 25. 
 141. Id. at 26. 
 142. See id. at 32, 34–35. 
 143. See ALEXANDER WALTER GARDNER ET AL., WATER RESOURCES LAW, 12–16 (2nd ed. 
2018). 
 144. TISDELL, WARD AND GRUDZINSKI, supra note 136, at 19 (citations omitted). 
 145. COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, supra note 138. 
 146. Id., cl 5(a). 
 147. GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 47–48. It is worth noting that the relationship between 
the states and the Federal Government in Australia is different in several ways to that in the United 
States of America. The difference is often characterised as one between a collaborative and complemen-
tary federation of states in Australia and “competitive federalism” in America. But the American charac-
teristic may, in fact, better describe the Australian condition in respect of the issue of government fund-
ing. The Federal Government may often tie its promise of funding for a state to its expectation of the 
fulfilment of a mutual obligation, as was the case in this example. The obligation often requires the state 
to legislate or enforce a reform that it had been hitherto reluctant to pursue. An analogy may be made to 
the relationship between the central authorities of the European Union and the legislatures of its mem-
ber states. 
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by all the states and territories by the end of the millennium.148 The legislation 
amended the common law position such that riparian rights were subject to pre-
scribed limitations, and created ministerial powers for the regulation and re-
striction of water use. 
One decade later, there was a second call for reforms, prompted by the “in-
crease in demand for water . . . [the] increased understanding of the management 
needs of surface and groundwater systems . . . [and] an enhanced understanding of 
the requirements for effective and efficient water markets.”149 This culminated in 
the 2004 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (NWI).150 
This agreement was not legally binding, nor were its principles enforced by the 
threat of withheld federal money as with the CoAG agreement a decade earlier.151 
Yet the states did respond to it with legislative reforms, though as we shall see, 
they have been only partially implemented.152 The NWI adopted the principle of 
unbundled rights from the CoAG,153 and elaborated on the content of water licens-
es and the process by which they could be traded and enforced. It called on the par-
ties to adopt certain features of “water access entitlements,” including that they 
would 
(i) specify the essential characteristics of the water product; 
(ii) be exclusive; 
(iii) be able to be traded, given, bequeathed or leased; 
(iv) be able to be subdivided or amalgamated; 
(v) be mortgageable (and in this respect have similar status as freehold 
land when used as collateral for accessing finance); 
(vi) be enforceable and enforced; and 
(vii) be recorded in publicly-accessible reliable water registers that foster 
public confidence and state unambiguously who owns the entitle-
ment, and the nature of any encumbrances on it . . . .154 
The NWI made it clear that any allocations of water to a water access entitle-
ment had to be consistent with a water plan.155 Clause 36 of the NWI recognizes 
the importance of water plans for the management of both surface and groundwa-
ter. It also highlights the important role they play in assisting governments and the 
 
 148. Water Resources Act 1998 (ACT); Water Management Act 2000 (NSW); Water Act 2000 (Qld); 
Water Resources Act 1997 (SA); Water Management Act 1999 (Tas); Rights in Water and Irrigation Amend-
ment Act 2000 (WA). Victoria and the Northern Territory had earlier already passed their own legisla-
tion: Water Act 1992 (NT); Water Act 1989 (Vic). 
 149. Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 4. 
 150. Id. 
 151. On the lack of an enforcement mechanism, see GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 50–52. 
 152. See infra Section II.C. 
 153. Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 28. 
 154. Id. at ¶ 31. 
 155. Id. at ¶ 29. 
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community to make water management and allocation decisions, and thereby to 
reach the productive environmental and social objectives. There is specific recogni-
tion of the fact that there should be separate regulatory approvals for each element 
of the water access arrangements in clause 30, which in turn refers to a set of 
“Principles for regulatory approvals for water use and works” contained in schedule 
D of the NWI. Those principles seek to ensure that regulatory approvals enabling 
water use at a particular site for a purpose are consistent with relevant water and 
planning legislation and policy156 and water plans.157 They should take into account 
the environmental social and economic impacts of use,158 contain clear condi-
tions,159 minimize the applicant’s costs of application and compliance,160 and pro-
vide avenues for appeal of decisions.161 
In South Australia, the NWI prompted the enactment of the Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA) and later amendments to the Act passed in 2007. We 
turn now to an analysis of those provisions. 
C.  State Implementation: Natural Resources Management Act 2004 
The NWI agreement sought the establishment of “water plans,” that is, the 
central planning of water allocation, so that entitlements to water use would be dis-
tributed consistent with “productive, environmental and social objectives.”162 
While the agreement failed to address the inherent tension between productive and 
environmental objectives, it sought to regulate the approval of water access enti-
tlements, so that—in most states and territories, including South Australia163—the 
entitlements must not be granted unless they are consistent with the plan.164 
The Government of South Australia has “prescribed” ninety per cent of water 
resources in the state.165 Prescription allows the central planning of water alloca-
tion, and so the regulation of tradeable rights. However, the process of unbundling 
water rights in South Australia has yet to be completed. When the Natural Re-
sources Management Act 2004 (SA) (NRM) was passed, and when it was amended in 
 
 156. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(i). 
 157. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(ii). 
 158. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(iii). 
 159. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(iv). 
 160. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(v). 
 161. Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(viii). 
 162. Id. at ¶ 36. 
 163. GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 247-48. 
 164. In South Australia, the relevant provisions are Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) 
ss 124(7), 127(2). 
 165. S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF WATER, LAND, BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION, SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA’S WATER FUTURE, 8 (2006). 
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2007, it was expected that all water rights would be unbundled by 2014.166 In late 
2017, the Productivity Commission reported that rights to surface water in South 
Australia—where they are separate from land, as in regulated watercourses—have 
so far been unbundled only in the Murray–Darling Basin.167 Groundwater rights 
remain bundled everywhere in the state, other than in the Southern Basins and 
Musgrave Prescribed Wells management area on the Eyre Peninsula (see Figure 
2).168 The Productivity Commission reported that 
South Australia is. . . updating its Policy Statement: Implementation of Un-
bundling Water Rights in South Australia to identify opportunities to ensure 
the implementation of unbundled water rights supports quicker, simpler 
and more pragmatic water allocation planning.169 
This policy statement has yet to be updated.170 It has been suggested that the rela-
tively limited trade in water outside the Murray–Darling Basin may be “attributed 
to factors such as water rights remaining bundled.”171 Conversely, lower pre-
existing trade activity in those regions may have weakened the impetus for estab-
lishing and reforming the system of trade. 
As already described, the NWI contemplated that all states would unbundle 
water rights.172 South Australian legislation, like that of other states, set up ar-
rangements for the use and licensing of water with separate approvals or permits 
for each component.173 The key provisions of the Act itself do not contemplate a 
continuation of a bundled water rights system.174 However, to accommodate a sys-
tem where water rights had been bundled for many years, transitional arrange-
ments were necessary, as found in the Natural Resources Management (Water Re-
sources and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2007 (SA). Section 5 of that Act provides 
for the continuation of bundled licensing arrangements unchanged “until the min-
ister otherwise determines.”175 These provisions are elaborated and repeated in 
regulation 47 of the Natural Resources Management (General) Regulations 2005 
 
 166. S. AUSTL. OFFICE FOR WATER SECURITY, WATER FOR GOOD: A PLAN TO ENSURE OUR 
WATER FUTURE TO 2050, 169 (2010). 
 167. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, NATIONAL WATER REFORM, 339 (2017). 
 168. Id. 
 169. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 167, at 341. 
 170. The latest policy statement was issued in 2012. See S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WATER 
AND NAT. RES., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS 
IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (2012). 
 171. D.J. McKane & I. Franssen, An Adaptive Approach to Water Rights Reform in South Australia, 
in WATER RESOURCES MGMT. VII 61, 65 (C.A. Brebbia ed., 2013). 
 172. See National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 63 (demonstrating agreement between 
several states that provides for unbundling practices). 
 173. Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at s 5(2)(a)-(b). 
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(SA). The regulations were meant to expire in 2016.176 However, their expiration 
date was extended to 1 September 2019, presumably because of the slow pace at 
which the unbundling of water licenses had already occurred. 
 
 
 
 176. In South Australia, under the provisions of s 16(1)(g) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1978 
(SA), regulations made after 1 January 1987 will expire after a period of 10 years. The expiry can be 
postponed for between 2 to 4 years: s 16C(1). The purpose of this provision is to ensure regular review 
and updating of delegated legislation. 
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FIGURE 2. WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AREAS OF  
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 2010177 
 
 
 
 
 177. The diagram draws upon S. AUSTL. DEP’T FOR ENV’T. AND WATER (2018). Illustration © 
Nigel Williams 2019 (used with permission). 
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The situation remains uncertain because the state Liberal government in 
South Australia was elected in March 2018 on a platform that included reform of 
the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA).178 A proposal for a new Land-
scapes South Australia Act (which would repeal the Natural Resources Management 
Act) was released for public comment in July 2018.179 A report following that con-
sultation was released,180 and it was anticipated that the draft bill would be put be-
fore the South Australian Parliament in 2019.181 It appears that the reforms will 
largely be to the structure and form of the administrative bodies established to 
manage natural resources. There is little substantive change to water management. 
The legislative reform therefore seems to resolve little of the uncertainty that pres-
ently exists regarding the future of the unbundling process. 
D. Balance Between Bundled and Unbundled 
The unbundling of water rights from land has been described as the “lynchpin 
of water reform.”182 Unbundling of water rights “can increase trading opportunities 
and thus provide water users with greater flexibility to manage their water access, 
use, delivery and land-holding needs.”183 It is meant to result in more efficient wa-
ter use and improve the system for water trading. However, unbundling is not 
without its detractors. Some see the whole process as equating to the privatization 
of water, which they believe is “incompatible with the protection of water as a pub-
lic good.”184 And concerns are particularly poignant in the agricultural sector, 
where users need water to irrigate a range of produce including wine, orchards and 
vegetables.185 The real question, here, though, is whether the policy of unbundling 
followed in South Australia has the unintended result of producing the potential 
for an anticommons tragedy. Our assessment in this section of the available anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the risk of an anticommons tragedy is a real one. 
 
 178. Natural Resources Management – Empowering Communities, LIBERAL PARTY SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA (2018), https://strongplan.com.au/policy/natural-resources-management/. 
 179. We’re Changing NRM in South Australia, YOURSAY, https://yoursay.sa.gov.au/decisions/
landscape-reform/consultation_process (last visited June 23, 2018). 
 180. BECKY HURST CONSULTING, MANAGING OUR LANDSCAPES: CONVERSATIONS FOR 
CHANGE (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/files/sharedassets/public/get_involved/
managing-our-landscapes-summary.pdf. 
 181. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/natural-resources-
management (last visited June 6, 2019). 
 182. Ian Douglas, Water Wars: The Battle Between Public and Private, ABC NEWS OPINION (May 
26, 2011), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-26/douglaswater/2731364. 
 183. AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, WATER TRADING RULES – FINAL 
ADVICE, 43 (2010). 
 184. Douglas, supra note 182. 
 185. See BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 57. 
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In the discussion paper issued with proposals for a new Landscapes South Aus-
tralia Act, consultants noted that while water management reform was not a signifi-
cant component of the first tranche of the legislative review it was nevertheless a 
topic that the broader community consistently raised as an issue in their submis-
sions to the enquiry.186 Water allocations, water security, water availability, and 
sustainable water management were issues of particular concern.187 More monitor-
ing and regulation of water use was seen as important.188 Concern was expressed 
about unbundling as well, with one natural resources management board submit-
ting that the requirement to unbundle water rights would lead to more complex 
and cumbersome water allocation plans.189 The environmental NGO, Trees for 
Life, recommended a review of unbundling of water rights in the new legislation, 
arguing that “[u]nbundling can work for water assets in a large system like the 
Murray River but not necessarily for other systems.”190 Experience may bear this 
out, as demonstrated by the limited implementation of unbundling over South 
Australia’s other water resources to date.191 
In its policy on the implementation of unbundling water rights in South Aus-
tralia, the South Australian state government outlined some of the “significant 
benefits” that can be created by the unbundling of water rights. They include 
• Clarification of the ownership attributes of water as separate from 
the commitments and obligations associated with its taking and use, 
• Improved ability to trade water rights both within South Australia 
and between South Australia and other States, 
• Faster processing times that will provide greater certainty and flexi-
bility in the management of water portfolios, 
• The ability more easily to trade the seasonal volume of water inde-
pendently of the ongoing water right (the water access entitlement), 
and 
• Greater flexibility in the options for managing water including deal-
ing with variability in a water resource.192 
 
To these can be added:193 
• The rules on extraction would not be directly linked to changes in 
entitlements or allocations, and therefore the value of the asset would 
 
 186. See id. at 56. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. at 57. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Supra, Section II.C. 
 192. GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 1. 
 193. Unpublished Notes of Paul Leadbeter, Member, Tatiara Water Allocation Plan Review 
Stakeholder Advisory Group (on file with author) (notes based on meetings of the Group during 2018). 
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not be affected. The asset is the entitlement to a certain amount of 
water. Conditions that restrict or limit its use or extraction may re-
duce its attraction as a tradable or transferable asset. 
• Management rules that relate to each water management authoriza-
tion can be better separated and dealt with in separate components of 
the relevant water allocation plan, which eases transferability. For 
example, with transfer of a bundled license, consideration has to be 
given to any restrictions on the water allocation imposed by condi-
tions governing extraction of the water or its use. In an unbundled 
system, if someone simply purchases a water allocation, they have no 
inherent restriction on the extraction of that water or how or where it 
is used. The purchaser will need to seek his or her own water man-
agement authorizations to enable the purchaser to extract and use the 
water allocation they have purchased. Conditions restricting how and 
where water can be used, which are often attached to a bundled water 
license, can significantly limit the potential use of the allocation and 
lower its value as an asset. 
• The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in its “Fi-
nal advice on water trading rules” noted another possible advantage 
of unbundling.194 Sometimes a person may want to hold their water 
access right and allocation rather than use it. They may do so because 
they want to sell it rather than use it themselves, or they may hold it 
for environmental purposes. If someone has a right to use water but 
does not do so then the water remains in the system and potentially 
benefits the environment. If a person wishes to purchase a water ac-
cess right and allocation and use it, they must also obtain a site use 
approval or water delivery right (which would not be the case in a 
bundled system). Arguably under the bundled system the person 
would find it almost impossible to enter the water market on the 
terms they desired because of the conditions of a site use approval, 
which would be attached to the license. 
Although not identified in the South Australian government’s policy on un-
bundling, there are also some potential disadvantages of the unbundling process if 
taken to the full extent contemplated by the National Water Initiative and the li-
censing provisions in the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). They in-
clude 
• Within a prescribed water area, if there is more than one consump-
tive pool, no trade can occur between those pools.195 
 
 194. AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 183, at 43. 
 195. A water access entitlement under the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 is an entitle-
ment for the license holder to gain access to a share of water in a defined consumptive pool or pools: 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 146(2). The holder obtains a water allocation for that 
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• The extraction of water through the water resource works approval is 
not linked to the allocation. The licensee needs to be very aware of 
their water allocation and any limits imposed on the water resource 
works approval that may be difficult for them to manage at any par-
ticular site where the licensee holds more than one water resource 
works approval. In the case of bundling, the license makes clear the 
amount of water allocated to the licensee and therefore what can be 
extracted through the water resource works, all in the one docu-
ment.196 
• The current bundled licensing system that operates in South Austral-
ia, with its attendant conditions and restrictions that effectively deal 
with the allocation, approval of extraction and water conveyance 
equipment, and the rules about where and how the water is to be 
used is understood and accepted by water users requiring some form 
of water management authorization.197 A new unbundled system 
brings with it some uncertainty for water users. 
The use of an unbundled system is therefore potentially costlier and administra-
tively more burdensome than a bundled system of water rights. An individual an-
nual fee may be charged for each water management authorization, whereas in a 
bundled system there is only one annual license fee. 
Given the history of governmental reform throughout the 1990s and 2000s,198 
and the added urgency brought on by the Millennium Drought,199 we argue that 
the real driver of pressure for unbundling of water rights was the situation in the 
Murray-Darling basin. If that is so, then the process has been successful to the ex-
tent that all water rights along the River Murray have been unbundled by the three 
key states (Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia), permitting efficient 
and effective interstate trade arrangements.200 Water trades have continued to rise 
 
defined pool. A holder may only transfer their allocation within the consumptive pool to which they 
have access. Id. at s 150(1). 
 196. Id. at s 159. 
 197. For example, see the concerns expressed by the South East Natural Resource Management 
Board in its submissions on the proposal to create new natural resource management legislation. BECKY 
HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 57. 
 198. COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, supra note 138. 
 199. The Millennium Drought in Australia lasted from 2001-2009 and was arguably the longest 
and most severe drought since Europeans settled the continent in 1788. It affected almost all of the 
southern part of the Australian continent including the major cities of Melbourne and Adelaide. The 
state of South Australia was particularly hard hit; authorities established various measures to guarantee 
certainty of water supply to Adelaide, including the construction of a very expensive desalination plant. 
MURRAY-DARLING BASIN ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, ROYAL COMMISSION (2019), 
https://www.mdbrc.sa.gov.au/sites/default/files/murray-darling-basin-royal-commission-report.pdf?v=
1548898371. 
 200. McKane and Franssen, supra note 172, at 62. 
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across the country, many of them within the Murray-Darling basin, an area which 
covers a seventh of the Australian continent’s land mass and has been described as 
the “breadbasket of the nation.”201 Across the Australian continent, entitlement and 
water allocation trade volumes in 2016–17 were 2,100 gigaliters, which was 23% 
higher than in 2015–16.202 The total volume of surface water allocations traded dur-
ing the same period was 7,000 gigaliters, which is 20% higher than the previous 
year.203 While much of that trade occurred within the Murray-Darling Basin re-
gion, a substantial number of trades occurred outside of the Murray-Darling Basin 
system in accordance with relevant State legislation.204 The fact that states like 
South Australia have not fully unbundled water rights does not appear to be pre-
venting water trades. 
As noted above, apart from the River Murray area and two prescribed wells 
areas in the state, no other unbundling of water resources has occurred in South 
Australia. This is despite statutory provisions which contemplate that unbundled 
water rights are the norm when any licenses involving the taking and use of water 
are issued, and various government policy statements to the effect that unbundling 
will occur and be implemented as part of the regular review of water allocation 
plans.205 
Still, the separation of property rights in relation to land and water appears to 
have been achieved and accepted. The fact that in South Australia most water 
rights remain bundled does not appear to have prevented trade in water allocations 
and entitlements, although it remains an open question whether there would be a 
greater number of trades if the water licenses were split into the various constitu-
ent water management authorizations contemplated by the Natural Resources Man-
agement Act 2004 (SA). With respect to their water entitlements, people remain 
able to sell, lease, bequeath, and treat as equitable those rights without much ap-
 
 201. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., A NATIONAL PLAN FOR WATER SECURITY 3 (25 January 
2007), http://www.crcsi.com.au/assets/Resources/f21ceb9e-2258-4f40-9e11-50fa80ee940e.pdf. 
 202. See ABARES Australian Water Markets Reports 2016-17, AUSTL. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER, 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/water/aust-water-markets-reports (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018). 
 203. See Water in Australia, AUSTL. BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, http://www.bom.gov.au/
water/waterinaustralia/ (last visited June 24, 2019). 
 204. Each Australian state has in place a similar system for licensing and managing water use and 
allocation as part of the requirement to which all states and the Australian Capital Territory agreed as 
part of the National Water Initiative in 2004. All states exhibit similar experiences to South Australia, 
with entitlements to some resources being unbundled and others remaining bundled. See Australia’s Wa-
ter Blueprint: National Reform Assessment 2014, AUSTL. NAT’L WATER COMM’N (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/water/nwi-assessment-2014.pdf. 
 205. The Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) contemplates that Natural Resources Man-
agement Boards will review their plans on a regular basis and must review their entire regional Natural 
Resources Management Plan (which includes the Water Allocation Plan) at least once every 10 years. 
The water allocation plans reviewed to date seem to be reviewed after 10 years, not earlier. Natural Re-
sources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 81(4). 
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parent trouble.206 Thus, although South Australia has not fully implemented un-
bundling across the entire state, there is nevertheless recognized water manage-
ment taking place. Trades of water are occurring, irrigators are obtaining access to 
water allocations for irrigation purposes, and the National Water Initiative re-
quirements are being implemented to a reasonable extent.207 
South Australia’s dry conditions have made irrigators and industry very con-
scious of the regular shortages of water and the need to adopt as many water con-
servation measures as possible;208 long gone are the days of profligate and unsus-
tainable irrigation practices.209 Water is an expensive and precious commodity, and 
the approach to its use by the South Australian irrigators in particular is by and 
large sensible and pragmatic. This has, in turn, influenced their approach to the 
trading of water entitlements. In light of the careful approach taken by South Aus-
tralian irrigators, the policy and legislative approach to unbundling pursued by 
South Australia may go too far—it may result in an inability to make effective and 
efficient use of the water resource for irrigated agriculture. Or, as we have de-
scribed it here, the approach taken in South Australia has the potential to create 
anticommons tragedies in respect to the allocation and use of water. 
CONCLUSION 
The South Australian experience reveals that both government policy and the 
market itself are driving the approach to unbundling. And as we have shown, nei-
ther those charged with implementing the law relating to unbundling, nor the mar-
ket actors holding existing proprietary interests in water, are eager fully to imple-
ment unbundling, or even to implement it at all. The policy, which prompted the 
pursuit of water regulation reform in Australia in the mid-1990s, was aimed at im-
proving the competitiveness of the Australian agricultural product. According to 
the liberal economic consensus of the time, a more efficient allocation of resources 
could be achieved by the creation of a freer market for inputs, in this case water. 
But the reluctance, which has hindered reform for the last two decades, suggests 
that the policy has failed to convince all stakeholders. 
It seems that the reforms have done nothing to resolve the identified tension 
between ecological and social interests in preserving natural water sources and the 
economic interest in achieving their most efficient allocation for production. If an-
ything, unbundling would tilt the balance further toward the latter. Market actors, 
especially those who hold rights to water that would be eroded by unbundling, are 
 
 206. BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 56-57. 
 207. AUSTL. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, supra note 204, at 280-97. 
 208. Water for Good, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF WATER, LAND AND BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION (2009) https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/files/sharedassets/public/water/water-for-
good-full-plan.pdf. 
 209. Id. at 16. 
_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020 4:03 PM 
Fall 2019] Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia 143 
 
unwilling to cede the economic advantage that the existing system has given them. 
The ecological interest will only become more urgent as the prospect of climate 
change—and so the harshening of dry conditions—makes water a scarcer resource. 
Ultimately, the balance is a question of social objectives. What is the most favored 
use and allocation of the scarce supply of water in Australia? What then follows is 
the legal mechanism to realize the objective. Without addressing the ecologi-
cal/social–economic/productive tension, the legal mechanism will remain deficient. 
Arguably, the process of unbundling in South Australia has never really taken 
off because irrigators who most need the water and the trading rights in relation to 
that water have been able to obtain and make use of water without too much trou-
ble using existing bundled licenses. In short, irrigators want maximal certainty and 
minimal delays, costs, and administrative burden. Our anecdotal assessment re-
veals, however, that in South Australia there is a perception among some that the 
introduction of an unbundled system and the associated permits and approvals will 
add to administrative load, increase costs, and result in a slower transfer process.210 
Unbundling of water rights contemplates rights that are transferable,211 typically 
through separating those rights from underlying interests in land.212 It is under-
standable that irrigators might believe that separate permits for different uses of 
water will be both expensive and administratively burdensome. At present, the 
bundled licenses allow all administrative aspects of water use to be dealt with by 
way of conditions attached to the transfer of a water license. Water allocation re-
mains subject to conditions as to its use on-site and appropriate works for extrac-
tion, conveyance, and storage. The current bundled licenses allow for assurances in 
relation to use and extraction to be dealt with pursuant to the Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA), which requires that the transfer of a water license213 
and allocation214 are both subject to the Minister’s approval. As such, unless condi-
tions on use and infrastructure are attached, the Minister will withhold consent to 
the transfer. 
In short, our assessment suggests that the objectives of the National Water In-
itiative are being achieved even in the absence of full implementation of unbundled 
water rights, and that water users—market actors—seem to be happy with the sys-
tem. We are left with a simple conclusion: why change a system that seems to be 
working? There are, of course, more serious reasons for asking whether unbundling 
will achieve the objectives claimed by its proponents. For while the failure to im-
plement unbundling on the part of governmental actors, or to take it up on the part 
of market actors cannot be taken as causally related to concerns about an anticom-
mons tragedy, it ought at the very least to stand as a warning to those advocating 
 
 210. BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 56. 
 211. Water access entitlement and water allocation. See supra Section II.A. 
 212. Water resource works approval and site use approval. See supra Section II.A. 
 213. Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 150(4). 
 214. Id. at s 157(2). 
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the full unbundling of proprietary interests in water. As Heller cautions,215 any 
moves which take a system of property closer to the anticommons end of the spec-
trum risk even greater inefficiency in the use of the subject resource. 
Our theoretical assessment of anticommons property and its potential for 
tragedies, when applied to the anecdotal evidence of attitudes in South Australia to 
unbundled water rights reveals an opposition to further unbundling. Further em-
pirical research is needed, both of the market and of market actors, which will test 
the validity of the claims made by advocates of unbundling, the perceived need on 
the part of water users for such measures, and the potential for anticommons trage-
dies following from full implementation. The need for such empirical evidence is 
not limited to South Australia. As we suggested in the Introduction, many other 
jurisdictions are currently either considering or in the process of implementing 
some form of unbundling of water resource allocations. As the movement towards 
unbundling gathers pace, we are in need of empirical evidence in order to assess, as 
a matter of law, the effectiveness of such systems. 
 
 215. Heller, supra note 60, at 623-24, 677. 
